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In recent years, several studies have advocated the need to expand the concept of patient 
autonomy beyond the capacity to deliberate and make decisions regarding a specific 
medical intervention or treatment (decision-making or decisional autonomy). Arguing along 
the same lines, this paper proposes a multidimensional concept of patient autonomy 
(decisional, executive, functional, informative, and narrative) and argues that determining 
the specific aspect of autonomy affected is the first step toward protecting or promoting 
(and respecting) patient autonomy. These different manifestations of autonomy are not 
mutually dependent; there may be patients who have problems in one dimension, while 
at the same time being fully autonomous in others. Nevertheless, a close interaction has 
been observed between the various dimensions, and indeed, a phenomenological analysis 
shows that damage to or a reduction in one aspect of people’s capacity for self-government 
generally affects other aspects of their autonomy, which in turn disrupts their identity and 
the way in which they see themselves and are seen by others. In this paper, I shall examine 
some of these interactions and show how they may lie at the heart of the problem of poor 
treatment adherence in many patients with chronic ailments (where adherence is defined 
as being the extent to which a patient’s behavior over time coincides with the 
recommendations made by and agreed with their health professional). One example given 
is that of psoriasis, a chronic skin disease with a very poor adherence record. In Spain, 
it is calculated that 85% of patients diagnosed with mild to moderate psoriasis fail to 
comply properly with their treatment, and figures from other parts of the world are similar. 
Although there are many possible causes for non-adherence among psoriasis patients, 
assessing their decisional, executive, and narrative capacities and taking appropriate 
action based on the results may help increase adherence rates.
Keywords: patient autonomy, decisional autonomy, executive autonomy, narrative autonomy, capacity, identity, 
adherence to treatment, psoriasis
INTRODUCTION
The debate on patient autonomy has been a central feature in the development of bioethics 
and, more specifically, clinical ethics. In one of the most influential works written on the 
subject, Beauchamp and Childress (1979/2001, p.  58) state that all theories of autonomy agree 
that two conditions are essential for autonomy: liberty (independence for controlling influences) 
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and agency (capacity for intentional action). However, medical 
ethics has largely been more concerned with the regulatory 
dimension, i.e., the principle of respect for autonomy, than with 
the theories of autonomy underpinning that principle (Arrieta, 
2016). It has emphasized the first element (the liberty that 
must be  afforded subjects to choose and act) and neglected 
the second (their capacity to implement the options they freely 
choose). Much of the clinical literature centers more on legal 
aspects of how to protect a right than on the personal or 
subjective aspects underlying patients’ capacity to decide 
autonomously (Casado and Etxeberria, 2014, p.  36).
The prevailing perspective of autonomy is strongly influenced 
by legal and juridical constructs designed to protect the right 
that citizens enjoy under normal circumstances to run their 
own lives (Gracia, 1989/2008, 2012; Tauber, 2005, 2011; Arrieta, 
2012; Arrieta and Casado, 2014), such as those proposed by 
Frankfurt (1971), Dworkin (1988), and Christman (1989). These 
definitions of autonomy were not developed specifically for 
individuals with a disease or disability, but rather for healthy 
agents and citizens. These models of autonomy have been 
influential in discussions related to free will (Müller and Walter, 
2010, pp.  206–207) but have also become the standard model 
of autonomy used in bioethics (Felsen and Reiner, 2011).
Agich (2007) writes that chronic care has generally been 
of only peripheral interest in bioethics. In the final decades 
of the twentieth century, for reasons of pragmatic necessity 
and operativity, work in the field concentrated mainly on the 
fast and urgent decisions that have to be  made in tertiary 
healthcare, with immediate and sometimes dramatic, life-or-
death, consequences. Because the concept of patient autonomy 
has been developed within the context of acute care, it rightly 
centers on decisional (or decision-making) autonomy, i.e., the 
patient’s capacity to understand information and to make 
voluntary decisions (Naik et  al., 2009). The most widespread 
notion of autonomy is identified with the freedom of choice 
of someone who is rational and capable of making decisions 
(Cassell, 2010). In the literature on bioethics, there is a constant 
tendency to equate autonomy with autonomous decision-making 
(see seminal works on medical ethics such as Reich, 1978; 
Beauchamp and Childress, 1979/2001; Jonsen et al., 1982), and 
the greatest autonomy-related problems are generally linked 
to issues such as informed consent, decision-making capacity, 
and surrogate decision-making in the case of people who have 
been declared mentally incompetence (Agich, 2007, pp. 74–75).
The nature of autonomy varies depending on the social 
context in which the concept is applied (Anderson, 2013, 
2014a,b). In acute care situations, it is quite appropriate to 
view autonomy almost exclusively in decisional terms, for the 
purposes of accepting or rejecting a specific therapeutic decision. 
This decision-making process can be  approached in a similar 
way to that habitually exercised by healthy and able-bodied 
individuals, and legal or juridical notions of autonomy may 
therefore be both appropriate and useful. However, these models 
of autonomy are much less satisfactory when it comes to 
situations of chronic disease and primary medicine, where 
interaction between professionals and patients is notably different 
and specific decisions are probably less important than the 
continued maintenance of the relationship itself. As well as 
strictly medical issues and respect for freedom of choice, greater 
attention should be  paid to the particularities of patients or 
people in need of healthcare, i.e., the biological, psychological, 
and social aspects that enable them to be  autonomous. In 
many such cases, especially in situations of chronic fatal illness 
or degenerative diseases, any autonomy that does exist is 
precarious and in decline and therefore considerably removed 
from the “autonomy yes/autonomy no” way in which it is 
presented in decisional ethics. In situations of illness or weak 
or precarious health, autonomy has a different meaning than 
in other areas (such as the legal context) for the simple reason 
that it is diminished or compromised. Because autonomy can 
only be  respected if it exists (Matthews, 2007, p.  129), before 
respecting autonomy, healthcare workers must first seek to 
restore it (Arrieta, 2012, p. 28). Many authors therefore consider 
it paradoxical to view respect for autonomy as the overriding 
rule in medical ethics, given that in many cases, there is very 
little autonomy to be  respected (Kittay, 2007; Nys et  al., 2007).
Viewing decision-making capacity as the only feature of 
autonomy means ignoring many of its other manifestations. 
For this reason, it is necessary to “decentralize autonomy” 
(Meyers, 2005). While capacities for critical reflection or 
rational decision-making are essential in managing autonomous 
conduct, they belong to only one of the registers through 
which human autonomy emerges. In recent years, several 
authors (Casado, 2009; Naik et  al., 2009; Seoane, 2010, 2013; 
Arrieta and Casado, 2014; Casado and Etxeberria, 2014; Arrieta, 
2016) have advocated expanding the concept of patient 
autonomy to include not only patients’ ability to make free 
and therapeutically informed decisions (the decisional 
dimension) but also their capacity to plan, sequence, and 
perform tasks related to the management of their chronic 
diseases, i.e., to adhere to the chosen therapeutic plan (the 
executive dimension). Other areas to be  included are the 
ability to perform the basic vital functions and tasks that 
can be  carried out by a statistical majority of people (the 
functional dimension); to have control information on their 
situation in the manner of their choosing (informative 
dimension); and to retain, understand, and communicate to 
others, in a sufficiently coherent and understandable manner, 
the main identitary aspects that have characterized them 
during their lives (the narrative dimension).
This paper is based on the premise that knowing which 
aspect or aspects of autonomy are affected is a necessary 
prerequisite for protecting or promoting (and respecting) patient 
autonomy. Different ailments or circumstances (a medullar 
injury, depression, poor management of information, etc.) 
involve the impairment of one or more different manifestations 
of an individual’s autonomy, and each one should therefore 
be  studied separately. One of the requirements for a good 
understanding of a patient’s situation and the provision of 
good medical care is therefore to identify which dimensions 
are compromised or damaged. This leads us to pose a number 
of research questions: How are these dimensions related? Do 
they interact? If so, how? And what effects do they have on 
patients’ identity and medical and care processes?
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The different manifestations of patient autonomy are not 
necessarily related or mutually dependent. Patients may show 
a deficiency in one manifestation, while being fully autonomous 
in others. Nonetheless, a close interaction can be  observed 
between the different dimensions, and a major deficit in one 
capacity can cause a limitation in others. This combination of 
capacities directly impacts peoples’ identity, i.e., how they see 
themselves and how others see them. This paper offers some 
examples of these interactions and seeks to show how they 
may lie at the root of non-adherence issues in many patients 
with chronic ailments. Although there are many reasons for 
non-adherence (World Health Organization, 2016), my hypothesis 
is that appraising patients’ decisional, executive, and narrative 
capacities and acting accordingly may contribute to improving 
the situation. To test this hypothesis, I  take a chronic skin 
disease, psoriasis, which presents very low levels of adherence 
to treatment.
ADHERENCE TO TREATMENT
The management and treatment of chronic diseases is one of 
the most pressing challenges facing societies with an aging 
population, as is the case in Europe. As well as ruining the 
lives of millions of people, chronic diseases can be extraordinarily 
costly for society when not treated successfully. Non-adherence 
is a global phenomenon with serious consequences: loss of 
control over the disease, high costs for the health system due 
to an increased level of hospital admissions and readmissions, 
frustration among healthcare workers, reduced quality of life, 
high degree of family, and social attrition, etc. (Rojas Marcos, 
2012). Adherence to long-term therapy for chronic illnesses 
in developed countries averages 50%. In developing countries, 
the rates are even lower. Increasing the effectiveness of adherence 
interventions may have a far greater impact on the health of 
the population than any improvement in specific medical 
treatments (World Health Organization, 2003, p. XIII). 
Understanding the causes of low adherence to treatment and 
developing strategies for neutralizing them would therefore 
provide enormous benefits to patients, medical professionals, 
and society at large.
I define adherence as being the degree to which patients’ 
behavior over time (taking a drug, following a diet, altering 
habits and lifestyle) coincides with the recommendations agreed 
between them and their healthcare professional. In the area 
of treatment, non-adherence may be  either primary (failing 
to redeem the prescription at the pharmacy) or secondary 
(forgetting to take the drugs, prematurely discontinuing treatment, 
taking incorrect doses, changing dosing intervals, etc.) 
(Puig et  al., 2013, p.  493).
Over the past few decades, the development of approaches 
aimed at ensuring that patients continue therapy for chronic 
conditions over long periods of time has gone through several 
phases. Initially the patient was thought to be  the source of 
the “compliance problem.” Compliance is the fulfillment by 
a patient of a caregiver’s prescribed course of treatment. The 
term “adherence” has been proposed as an alternative to 
compliance and is growing in popularity. The word adherence 
is now preferred by many healthcare providers because 
“compliance” suggests that the patient is passively following 
the doctor’s orders and that the treatment plan is not based 
on a therapeutic alliance established between patient and 
physician. Furthermore, the idea of compliance is too closely 
associated with blame, on the part of either the providers 
or the patients, and the concept of adherence is a better 
way of embracing the dynamic and complex changes required 
of many individuals over long periods in cases of chronic 
disease. While the term “compliance” is seen as being overly 
normative and focuses exclusively on the patient’s behavior, 
the term “adherence” involves an assumption of shared 
responsibilities. Adherence is a complex behavioral process 
determined by various interacting factors, including the specific 
characteristics of the patient and the nature of the disease 
and its treatment but also the patient’s environment (operation 
of sanitary equipment, characteristics of the health system, 
social support, accessibility to health services, etc.). Physicians 
may contribute to poor adherence among patients by prescribing 
complex regimens, failing to adequately explain the benefits 
and side effects of a medication, not taking the patient’s 
lifestyle or the cost of the medication into consideration, 
and having a poor therapeutic relationship with their patients. 
Practitioners should always be  alert for poor adherence and 
may mitigate the problem by emphasizing the value of a 
patient’s regimen, making it simple, and customizing it to 
the patient’s lifestyle (Vermeire et  al., 2001; Osterberg and 
Blaschke, 2005; Barr, 2011).
Most of the studies conducted to date on treatment adherence 
relate to chronic diseases which involve a high cost for the 
patient, the healthcare industry and, by extension, the government 
also. Chronic diseases such as asthma, diabetes, hypertension, 
and HIV infection, or addictions such as smoking, have 
traditionally been cited in the literature as examples of challenges 
to adherence (World Health Organization, 2003; Osterberg and 
Blaschke, 2005). However, our knowledge of adherence levels 
in topical medication is limited. The reason may be  the route 
of administration or the fact that, in many cases, the condition 
is not life-threatening (Peralta and Carbajal, 2008). Although 
many different methods are available to measure medication 
adherence, the lack of a gold standard for doing so in cases 
of topical therapy continues to pose challenges (Feldman et al., 
2008). There is a need for improved quality of research and 
reporting in this area (Thorneloe et  al., 2012).
PSORIASIS
Psoriasis is an inflammatory disease of the skin (and occasionally 
of the joints) which causes thick red patches or plaques of 
skin, covered with silvery scales. It is caused by abnormally 
rapid renewal of skin cells (whereas healthy skin cells are 
replaced every 28–30  days, among patients with psoriasis, the 
process takes 4–6  days). It is a non-contagious disease, with 
a certain genetic predisposition, although its exact etiology is 
largely unknown. Psoriasis develops erratically and unpredictably, 
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with disease-free periods alternating with affected periods which 
may vary greatly in duration and intensity. Generally speaking, 
however, psoriasis is a chronic condition. It has been calculated 
that up to 80% of those affected suffer from the disease 
throughout their lives, either intermittently or continuously, 
with adverse emotional or psychological circumstances 
(bereavement, depression, periods of stress, etc.) sometimes 
acting as triggers or aggravators.
The negative impact of psoriasis on people’s lives can 
be  immense. Psoriasis affects people of all ages and in all 
countries. The prevalence of psoriasis in countries ranges 
between 0.09 and 11.43%, making psoriasis a serious global 
problem with at least 100 million individuals affected worldwide 
(World Health Organization, 2016, p.  1). Psoriasis is one of 
the most frequent reasons for consulting a dermatologist (Puig 
et  al., 2013) and one of the chronic diseases with the lowest 
adherence rates among patients. After years of work by a 
large number of patients’ organizations, in 2014, the World 
Health Organization passed a resolution recognizing psoriasis 
as “a chronic, non-communicable, painful, disfiguring, and 
disabling disease for which there is no cure”. This initiative 
turns the spotlight on the pathology, calling on member states 
to promote more research and to implement effective strategies 
to improve treatment, as well as encouraging them to engage 
further in advocacy efforts to raise awareness regarding the 
disease and to fight the stigmatization experienced by sufferers 
(World Health Organization, 2014, 2016).
Perhaps, the great therapeutic deficit with regard to psoriasis 
is that most of those affected either do not follow or incorrectly 
follow the treatment agreed upon with their doctor. In Spain, 
it has been calculated that 85% of patients diagnosed with 
psoriasis do not properly comply with treatment (Rojas 
Marcos, 2012); these figures are similar to those for other 
parts of the world (Kuehl and Shear, 2018). Patients with 
the lowest rates of adherence include those with mild to 
moderate psoriasis (i.e., affecting between 3 and 10% of the 
total body surface), who are generally prescribed topical 
treatment (creams, ointments, gels, etc.). For approximately 
70% of patients, such therapy is their only option (Puig 
et  al., 2013; Schaarschmidt et  al., 2013; Kuehl and Shear, 
2018). Topical therapy remains a pillar of psoriasis 
management, and adherence to treatment is a determining 
factor in ensuring efficacy. However, numerous studies 
specifically indicate that many patients with psoriasis consider 
the topical treatment to be  one of the most negative aspects 
of the disease (Feldman et  al., 2008; Rojas Marcos, 2012; 
Puig et  al., 2013; Choi et  al., 2017). The treatment must 
be  applied correctly and on a continuous basis. It requires 
time, discipline, and constancy, and the results are not always 
evident or may be  unsatisfactory, causing patient frustration 
and apathy. As a consequence, most patients either fail to 
apply the treatment properly or give up on it. It is estimated 
that nearly 50% of patients with psoriasis do not even 
purchase the prescribed product, and of those who do, up 
to 70% do not use their medication as per the instructions, 
which are often inadequate, confusing, or difficult to follow 
(Puig et  al., 2013).
THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF PATIENT 
AUTONOMY
Perhaps, because the concept originally stemmed from the 
legal tradition (Gracia, 1989/2008; Tauber, 2005, 2011), and 
because it initially centered on tertiary or emergency medicine 
(Agich, 2007; Naik et al., 2009), the prevailing clinical literature 
has tended to reduce patient autonomy to decision-making. 
The working assumption is that patients are autonomous if 
they show the capacity to make informed decisions. The 
obligation of healthcare workers is therefore to check that 
this capacity has not been diminished, either by the disease 
or any other circumstance. They must do everything possible 
to ensure that patients (or their representatives in case of 
incompetence) understand all issues related to their clinical 
status; inform them of the possible courses of therapeutic 
action available to them and make sure that they are acting 
of their own volition and not under any external duress. If 
so, patients are considered to be autonomous, and by extension 
competent to make decisions related to their bodies or health, 
and it is the practitioners’ duty to accept and respect 
their decisions.
Decisional autonomy refers to patients’ freedom of choice, 
in other words, their capacity to deliberate and decide on a 
course of action from among a suitable range of useful options 
(Seoane, 2013). This autonomy is exercised in a communicative 
process between the medical practitioner and the patient, 
subject essentially to three requirements: patients must (1) act 
voluntarily, i.e., with no external duress, (2) have sufficient 
information regarding the decision they are going to make 
(i.e., the aim of the decision, any risks and benefits and possible 
alternatives), and (3) have the capacity, i.e., possess a series 
of psychological (cognitive, volitional, and affective) capabilities, 
to be  able to know, appraise, and manage this information 
properly, to make a decision and to express it (Simón, 2008, 
p.  327; Arrieta, 2016).
Decisional autonomy was the first dimension to be addressed 
and consolidated. It is also the most ethically and legally 
developed, based on the theory of informed consent (Seoane, 
2013, p.  30). However, autonomy consists of much more than 
just the right to informed consent (which in many cases 
involves no more than asking a patient to sign a document 
they do not understand) and decision-making. Reducing 
autonomy in this way hampers the work of professionals and 
carers and can often create an atmosphere of mistrust amongst 
the different actors involved in the care relationship (Arrieta 
and Casado, 2014). Since it mainly affects the defense of users’ 
rights, the issue of autonomy is restricted to its legal dimension 
(Gracia, 2012) and to informed consent (Nys et  al., 2007; 
Puyol, 2012). Subjective personal aspects are neglected (Casado 
and Etxeberria, 2014), turning the patient into a “thing with 
rights”, forced to make decisions while their autonomy is 
ignored (Tauber, 2005, p.  17).
Moreover, the individualist perspective of much of the 
bioethical discourse does not fit well when applied to chronic 
disease and primary and family care. Concepts such as patients’ 
rights and autonomy need to be  reviewed in this context. 
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Here a relational, narrative, and participatory model of autonomy, 
grounded in the specific physiological and psychological 
circumstances of each patient, is more appropriate. Work carried 
out with notions such as disability and dependence has shown 
that it is helpful to distinguish between the capacity to make 
decisions and the possibility of putting those decisions into 
practice (Seoane, 2010, p.  64). Authors from fields such as 
“Disability Studies” and “Independent Living Movements” have 
worked extensively with the notion of functional autonomy, 
i.e., patients’ capacity to perform the basic activities of daily 
living and to individually undertake tasks that a statistical 
majority of people normally perform (such as eating, seeing, 
walking, understanding complex situations, etc.). A number 
of different measures or indicators of an individual’s functional 
capacity are now available. They include some universal and 
comprehensive examples, such as those contained in the 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 
(ICF) (World Health Organization, 2001) and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (United 
Nations, 2006) and also more specific ones which measure 
and assess a concrete function.
The problem with these and other classifications is that 
they cannot help being somewhat arbitrary. The standard used 
to evaluate these functions or structures is generally “the 
statistical norm for humans” (World Health Organization, 2001), 
and it is not easy to establish a statistical norm for each 
human activity or to measure the degree of deficit or deviation 
with regard to it. Moreover, it is tremendously difficult to 
establish a minimally objective cut-off point between one 
function and another, given how interconnected and dependent 
they are. Article 1 of the CRPD (United Nations, 2006) groups 
human impairments into four categories: physical, mental, 
intellectual, or sensory impairments. The ICF (World Health 
Organization, 2001), on the other hand, divides human functions 
into eight groups: mental functions, sensory functions, and 
pain; voice and speech functions; functions of the cardiovascular, 
hematological, immunological, and respiratory systems; functions 
of the digestive, metabolic, endocrine systems; genitourinary 
and reproductive functions; neuromusculoskeletal and movement-
related functions; functions of the skin and related structures. 
One might argue that this difference is due to a greater level 
of systemization and detail on the part of the ICF, and this 
is indeed the case (the aim of the UN Convention is not to 
list all the different impairments). The problem, however, lies 
not in the number of functions, but in the way they are 
classified. While the CRPD distinguishes between mental and 
intellectual functions, the ICF includes the latter among the 
former. For the sake of argument, I  classify the wide range 
of bodily functions into three large groups: mental, physical, 
and sensory.
An individual’s degree of functional autonomy is related to 
the state of their mental (cognitive, psychological and emotional, 
awareness or memory-related, etc.), physical (motor functions, 
anatomical functions and structures, those related to voice and 
speech and, in general, all physiological functions of the human 
body), and sensory functions (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, 
tactile, and pain-related). However, it is important to note that 
a person’s degree of functional autonomy will be  made up of 
a combination of their capacities and the possibilities of exercising 
them provided by their environment. To put it very simply, 
capacity is merely the aptitude or skill a person has to perform 
a task or action. They are resources that are inherent to the 
individual, but which require the right external conditions to 
be exercised. The way people function is nearly always conditioned 
by their environment, which rarely plays a neutral role in the 
extent to which they realize their capacities. It is often rightly 
remarked that a lack of functional autonomy derives not only 
from the disabilities people have but also from disabling 
environments. We  shall return to this matter below.
When the disease is chronic, patient autonomy is greater, 
but also more complex. It becomes more mundane, applying 
to more every day, and long-term cases. Autonomy goes beyond 
mere decision-making and becomes a process which is extended 
or executed over time. In simple terms, executive autonomy 
may be  defined as the capacity to implement the decision 
made and maintain it over time, in other words, to execute 
it. In the clinical sphere, this means that it involves the patient’s 
capacity to plan, sequence, and perform tasks related to the 
management of their chronic disease, especially those related 
to the planning and execution of treatment (Naik et  al., 2009). 
Whereas functional autonomy relates to the material possibility 
of performing a task (e.g., getting dressed without help), in 
the case of executive autonomy, the essential aspect is the 
ability to keep to the course of action decided upon (e.g., 
quitting smoking). This element of autonomy was already 
implicitly suggested in some early bioethical works, such as 
the definition of the autonomous person given in the 1979 
Belmont Report (National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 1979) 
or the condition of intentionality which Faden and Beauchamp 
(1986) developed in their ethical theory of autonomous action. 
However, its importance is greater when we shift the perspective 
from acute care, where a plan of intervention and care is 
authorized by the patient and executed by the clinical team, 
to chronic care, where the patient authorizes that plan and 
then plays an essential role in implementing it.
Healthcare professionals tend to interpret patients’ 
non-compliance or abandonment of therapy as a conscious 
and autonomous refusal to follow their recommendations or 
as the result of deficient understanding of the nature of the 
disease or the proposed therapeutic regimen. However, some 
patients with chronic conditions may be capable of articulating 
a clear understanding of the treatment and be entirely convinced 
that they will adhere to it when they visit the doctor but 
then prove incapable of performing the required tasks in 
their everyday lives. Clinicians generally have little awareness 
of these impairments, especially those linked to executive 
capacities, and do not actively take this aspect into consideration 
when developing treatment plans. This incapacity is ethically 
and clinically significant, as the patient’s executive autonomy 
may be  essential for effectively supervising and executing the 
treatment plan (Naik et  al., 2009, p.  24). As well as the 
problem of non-adherence, the consequences of ignoring or 
understating the importance of executive autonomy can 
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be  “poorer health outcomes for patients, repeated 
hospitalizations, and frustrated clinicians” (Russell, 2009, p. 32).
Autonomy is extolled in individuals, but individuals are 
only autonomous with and thanks to others (Casado, 2014). 
Good care is the product of a dialog (Nys et  al., 2007, p.  15). 
Rita Charon and other early advocates of the concept of narrative 
medicine have argued that communication between doctor and 
patient is the key to implementing a more humane model in 
medicine. In the last few decades, fields such as law, history, 
philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and politics have become 
aware of the importance of “narrative knowledge” (Charon, 
2001, p.  1898). More recently, there has also been much talk 
of a “narrative shift” in bioethics, medicine, and nursing. The 
main purpose is to provide patients with better care, gain a 
deeper knowledge of their cases, understand them, and be closer 
to them (López de la vieja, 2013, p.  25). This cooperative 
model requires a certain “narrative competence” on the part 
of the practitioner, i.e., “the ability to acknowledge, absorb, 
interpret, and act on the stories and plights of others” (Charon, 
2001, p.  1897). The doctor must be  able to see beyond the 
“case” to be  treated, in order to take in the whole-life situation 
of the individual (Gadamer, 1996, pp.  56–57).
The loss of balance experienced by a patient with a disease 
is not only a medical/biological fact; it is also a process linked 
to their life history and their relationship with others. The 
patient is no longer the same person as before. The individual 
becomes alienated and detached from their life story. This is 
where the idea of narrative autonomy comes in. This is the 
capacity that patients have to retain, understand, and 
communicate, coherently and understandably for others, both 
the circumstances of their present situation and the subjective, 
identitary, and cultural aspects that have characterized them 
during their lives and which may be  of relevance when it 
comes to developing a suitable and respectful line of therapeutic 
action. Narratively autonomous patients are capable of integrating 
their decisions into a narrative that they can share with others, 
complementing the practitioner’s clinical record with a first-
hand personal vision of their illness (Casado and Etxeberria, 
2014). Such narratives are both subjective—after all, who is 
better placed to tell their life stories than patients themselves?—
and intersubjective, since they require other people to be capable 
of recognizing and accepting the account they build of themselves. 
Merely being able to articulate a narrative is not a guarantee 
of the patient’s narrative autonomy. Narrators must be  capable 
of exteriorizing their experience, communicating their intentions, 
and using the necessary agential capacities to interact with 
and influence other people, and to do this, they require a 
minimally coherent and intelligible story that matches the 
reality. Having narrative autonomy means being capable of 
participating in certain types of communicative interactions 
with others, and it requires fundamental concurrence on the 
most basic features of the reality shared by patient and audience 
(Schechtman, 1996, pp.  119–120).
Finally, informative autonomy involves patients’ ability to 
access and control their personal, intimate, private, and public 
information (Seoane, 2013, p. 31). Informative autonomy covers, 
inter alia, the personal management of clinical information, 
the right to communicate or protect such information, the 
doctor’s duty of confidentiality, and the skills required to 
communicate with others about the condition (Casado and 
Etxeberria, 2014, p.  54). Whereas in the decisional dimension, 
the information has an instrumental value and refers to all 
medical aspects (details about treatment, side effects, etc.) that 
the patient needs to know to make an informed decision, in 
the informative dimension the information has an intrinsic 
value and enables patients to decide for themselves when and 
under what conditions they disclose situations referring to their 
own life and health (Seoane, 2013, p.  31). Either through 
omission or ignorance, certain aspects of informative autonomy 
have yet to be  integrated or consolidated in healthcare. Most 
theoretical studies and legal provisions to date have been written 
from a traditional perspective, focusing above all on the 
obligation to professional secrecy, patient privacy, and the 
confidentiality of the clinical documentation. However, a wider 
approach is needed that will also cover the most essential 
element of the informative dimension in the clinical field, i.e., 
all matters related to the protection, safekeeping, and management 
of personal data by the patient (Seoane, 2010, p.  64).
AUTONOMIES IN INTERACTION
In legal/juridical constructs of autonomy, it seems logical to 
equate the concept with a certain psychological capacity that 
individuals require in order to make decisions and assume 
responsibilities. In these theories, the central aspect is individuals’ 
mental state, their transitory or permanent capacity to take 
responsibility for their actions. Christman (1989, pp.  5–6), for 
example, observes that the “psychological ability for self-
government” is the common core of all conceptions of autonomy. 
He argues that features such as authenticity or self-determination, 
or notions of autonomy such as individual choice or political 
right, derive from this initial characteristic. However, in the 
medical domain this approach is insufficient. Patient autonomy 
has many different faces (Schermer, 2002) which would 
be  excluded if one were only to cover mental or 
psychological aspects.
The different dimensions of patient autonomy should not 
be  viewed as isolated realities, but rather as a continuum 
(Seoane, 2010, p. 63). Nonetheless, it may be helpful to address 
each one independently. Each dimension becomes especially 
visible at different moments or stages in the clinical-care process 
(when approving a medical operation, introducing a given 
treatment, managing information on a patient, dealing with 
people with physical disabilities or some degree of dementia, 
etc.). The duties and obligations they involve for healthcare 
practitioners and carers also vary (respect in some cases, 
restoration or promotion in others, etc.). As already discussed, 
autonomy entails considerably more than just decision-making 
by the patient and respecting that autonomy involves much 
more than simply presenting an informed consent form for 
signing. What is generically known as “patient autonomy” arises 
in different circumstances and in very different ways; some 
are well-established and traditional (such as decisional autonomy), 
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but others have yet to be  integrated or consolidated in the 
clinical relationship.
As stated earlier, the five manifestations of patient autonomy 
are not necessarily related or mutually dependent. Some patients 
enjoy only limited functional autonomy yet are decisionally, 
executively, or narratively autonomous. In other cases, poor 
executive autonomy may be  found with no other significant 
autonomous deficit. Other patients are capable of self-
determination but are the object of a pact of silence, and so 
on. In all of these cases, we  see a problem in the patient’s 
capacity for self-government, but only in one of the five elements 
that together make up their autonomy. However, a 
phenomenological examination shows that an impairment or 
damage to one aspect of a person’s capacity for self-government 
can strongly affect other aspects. The dimensions of patient 
autonomy can be  seen as a connected net: if one element 
falls, it can drag down another or even all of the others. They 
therefore need to be  studied separately, but also, as Naik et  al. 
(2009) suggest, it is necessary to study the “biopsychosocial 
correlates” linking them, given that a major shortfall in one 
manifestation of autonomy may act as a limitation in other 
dimensions. If a person suffers brain damage as the result of 
an accident, different manifestations of their autonomy will 
be  impacted. When patients lack any kind of information on 
their condition, they will be  unable to decide and act freely. 
If a tetraplegic person does not have adequate resources to 
lead their life, many questions related to decisional or executive 
aspects will no longer be  relevant, etc.
Let us take, for example, the connection between decisional 
and narrative autonomy. Some psychiatric patients (including 
those in hospital) with a distorted narrative autonomy have 
been found to be capable of making fairly uncomplex decisions 
regarding their treatment and other areas of their lives. However, 
in general, a person’s narrative capacity is what sustains and 
legitimates decision-making; patients will retain their decisional 
autonomy as long as they know how to frame their desires 
and decisions within a narrative that is coherent and intelligible 
for themselves and others. Patients’ decisional autonomy only 
makes sense if it is framed within a wider identitary and 
agential framework within which the individuals explain 
themselves and establish relations with others. To put it another 
way, a person will show capacity for complex decision-making 
(and there will therefore be  an obligation to respect their 
wishes) to the extent that they manage to integrate what happens 
in their life into an autobiographical narrative which matches 
the reality and perceptions of those close to them.
Let us now look at the interaction between decisional 
autonomy and functional autonomy. Take the case of an 
individual who is entirely healthy and competent from a 
psychological point of view but who has suffered a medullar 
injury as a result of an occupational accident and requires 
rehabilitation to walk again. Such a person currently has a 
lack of autonomy even though their psychological ability for 
self-government is not impaired. In this case, the work of all 
the agents involved (nurses, doctors, family members, public 
institutions, etc.) must be geared not so much toward “respecting” 
their autonomy as “promoting” or “restoring” it. Let us now 
consider the opposite case, a patient with no significant physical 
or sensorial impairment but with a serious mental disorder. 
Here too, the patient has a lack of autonomy. However, whereas 
in the first case, the absence of autonomy was only functional 
and did not concern their capacity for decision-making (which 
needs to be  respected just like that of any other patient); in 
the second case, the mental damage not only represents an 
impairment to their capacity for decision-making but also to 
other aspects of their autonomy. An important deficit in a 
person’s mental capacity will result in a diminishment of both 
their decisional and functional autonomy. We  can therefore 
see that people’s mental capacity is the link between decisional 
and functional autonomy (see Figure 1).
This link can be  found in all dimensions of autonomy. 
Unlike physical, sensory, or executive capacity, in order for 
human autonomy to exist, there must always be  some degree 
of mental capacity. An inability to walk or see usually entails 
a reduction in autonomy, but it does not necessarily mean an 
absence of other aspects of self-government. On the contrary, 
however, in cases of serious mental damage, no other dimension 
of autonomy is possible. It therefore follows that the individual’s 
mental capacity is a necessary but not in itself sufficient element 
of patient autonomy (Arrieta, 2016). It is a necessary element 
because all dimensions require a certain mental capacity on 
the patient’s part. Patients with very severe mental impairments 
are not capable of making decisions (decisional autonomy); 
of performing for themselves many tasks that a statistical 
majority of people can perform (functional autonomy); of 
keeping to a given treatment over time (executive autonomy); 
or of manifesting their communicative intentions in such a 
way as to mold the response of their audience (narrative 
autonomy). And clearly, we  can also rule out any informative 
autonomy, which requires that patients be “capable” of controlling 
and managing their personal information. Yet mental capacity 
is not in itself sufficient because limited autonomy may be due 
to a mental disability but also to other factors: there are patients 
who are fully mentally capable but have problems with autonomy 
(see Figure 2).
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between decisional and functional autonomy.
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To illustrate this thesis, let us return to the issue of psoriasis. 
The disease comes in many variants, ranging from miniscule 
marks on an elbow to the most severe forms, which affect over 
90% of the body surface, and which cause serious and even 
fatal health problems for the patient. In most cases, having 
psoriasis does not involve a physical deterioration or limitation 
in a person’s functional, motor, or mental capacity. To put it 
simply, people who are diagnosed with psoriasis are perfectly 
capable of continuing with their normal everyday activities 
(except in the most severe cases or those with a major psychological 
impact). Yet many patients have difficulties in another aspect 
of their autonomy, namely their capacity to apply the treatment 
agreed upon with their medical professionals. In the following 
section, I shall examine in greater detail the interaction between 
decisional autonomy and executive autonomy. I  aim to show 
that by working jointly on the two dimensions, it is possible 
to increase adherence to treatment in many chronic diseases.
DECISIONAL AUTONOMY, EXECUTIVE 
AUTONOMY, AND PSORIASIS
Among the different clinical tools available for assessing the 
mental capacity of patients with a psychiatric or medical 
pathology, perhaps the most useful and effective is the MacCAT-T 
(MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment) 
interview (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998). This instrument has 
become “the benchmark protocol” for evaluating mental 
competence (Simón, 2008, p.  345). It is the most widely used 
tool around the world, enjoying the greatest empirical support 
(Pose, 2015, p.  82) and offering the greatest reliability to 
evaluators (Ventura et  al., 2014). The interview assesses the 
patient’s degree of competence in decision-making in four 
psychological areas: (1) expression of a choice by means of 
verbal, written, or sign language. This is the first and most 
elementary skill; (2) understanding of information relevant to 
the decision to be  made; (3) appreciation, adequate assessment 
of the patient’s specific situation; and (4) reasoning, capacity 
to develop a system of logical argument, to use the information 
the patient has understood and appreciated to arrive at a 
decision (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998). Although other authors 
have since made their own contributions, these are still the 
four essential criteria when assessing patients’ clinical and 
psychiatric psychological capacity, and they have even begun 
to be  used to construct simple decision-making algorithms 
(Simón, 2008, p.  338).
It is important to note that the score obtained from a 
MacCAT-T does not offer irrefutable and categorical proof of 
a patient’s general ability or inability to make decisions. As 
the authors themselves say (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998), the 
FIGURE 2 | Mental capacity, necessary element of patient autonomy.
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scores obtained almost never form the basis for a definitive 
judgment of capacity. Unlike an individual’s weight or height, 
their decision-making capacity is not fixed and invariable, nor 
is it independent of human relations; rather it is the ability 
to understand and decide what is suitable for that individual 
depending on the context, the situation, and their state at any 
given moment in time. For this reason, the individual’s capacity 
must be  assessed for each specific decision, not in overall and 
definitive terms; indeed, Grisso and Appelbaum themselves 
recommend reassessing capacity whenever necessary.
It is my belief that this clinical assessment of the mental 
capacity of patients with chronic diseases should be  extended 
to include the capacity to adhere to an agreed treatment plan. 
Patients may be capable of engaging in a forthright deliberation 
on the planning and goals of the treatment but be  physically, 
cognitively, or educationally incapable (sometimes without being 
aware of their inability) of carrying it out successfully. The 
degree of executive capacity patients show has, in part, a 
physiological or biological explanation. In areas such as neurology, 
psychology, and psychiatry, the concept of “executive control 
functions” is very commonly used. Executive functions are 
cognitive and psychological skills that allow the individual to 
perform tasks such as anticipating and setting goals, forming 
plans and programs, self-regulating tasks, and carrying them 
out efficiently. In essence, the executive functions are concerned 
with “directing” behavior toward an objective, of structuring 
it over time. This temporal structuring of conduct is performed 
through the coordination of three subordinate functions, the 
retrospective function (required for short-term memory), the 
prospective function (which essentially aids conduct planning), 
and the control and supervision function (which enables control 
of stimuli and internal and external influences that may affect 
conduct) (Fuster, 1980/2008). In a certain sense, the executive 
functions are “the brain’s brain” (Lopera, 2008).
The scientific literature confirms that the frontal lobes are 
the neurobiological base of the executive functions. Patients’ 
executive skills have a known anatomical substrate. They reside 
in a specific place in the brain, the prefrontal cortex. As a 
diagnostic criterion, this is of great clinical use, since it allows 
empirical studies to be  performed to determine whether the 
patient has some problem or anomaly in that area. The possible 
alterations that may arise following an injury to the frontal 
lobe are very varied: they include cognitive, emotional, mnemic, 
motor, personality, and behavioral impairments. The reason 
for this wide variety of symptoms lies in the many higher 
functions governed from this lobe and the complexity of its 
associations with other cortical and subcortical areas of the 
brain (Rodríguez del Álamo et al., 2003, p. 605). Recent studies 
have identified associations between impairments in executive 
control functions and treatment self-management, performance, 
and outcomes of chronic medical and psychiatric conditions 
(Naik et  al., 2009, p.  28). These studies provide important 
empirical evidence to support the idea that one of the 
requirements of proper care for chronic patients is not only 
to assess their decision-making capacity and respect their 
decisions but also to assess their capacity to carry out different 
tasks related to disease self-management.
For a detailed assessment of different aspects of executive 
functions, a broad repertoire of tests has been developed in 
the field of neuropsychology. Those most frequently used are the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and variations of the 
Tower of Hanoi (Tower of London, Tower of Seville, etc.). 
These tests require a certain degree of sophistication and are 
quite complex to apply and interpret. Consequently, abridged 
tests have been developed that are simpler and quicker to 
conduct. The oldest and perhaps best-known of these is the 
“Executive Interview,” also known as EXIT 25. Another very 
well-known tool is the “Frontal Behavioral Inventory” (FBI), 
a survey directed not at the patient, but at the carer or person 
in charge of looking after the patient. The aim of this test is 
to pick up on positive or negative changes in the patient’s 
conduct and personality. The “Frontal Assessment Battery at 
Bedside” (FAB) is also very widely used. It takes around 10 min 
to perform and explores the functions of the frontal lobes.
Clinical tools commonly used to assess decision-making 
capacity (such as the MacCAT-T) should be  enhanced with 
others that assess executive capacity. Impairments in executive 
autonomy can occur independently of or in conjunction with 
impairments in decisional autonomy (Naik et  al., 2009). The 
cognitive areas assessed by the MacCAT-T (understanding, 
appreciation, reasoning, and expression of choice) should 
be  complemented with an assessment of the psychological and 
behavioral aspects covered by tools that assess executive functions, 
in order to obtain a more complete map of each chronic 
patient’s abilities for autonomy. In the case of frequent 
readmissions due to exacerbation of the disease, adverse effects 
of the medicine or other supposed markers of non-adherence, 
the doctor should consider whether the patient’s executive 
autonomy to administer the complex treatment plans and 
integrate them into their everyday life has deteriorated, either 
in isolation or in conjunction with impairments in their decisional 
autonomy. In short, effective treatment planning can be achieved 
through a dynamic and iterative process of identifying patients’ 
decisional and executive limitations and compensating for 
deficiencies in their executive capacity with appropriate clinical, 
family, and social support.
It is also important to remember that these tests or protocols 
are above all intended to assess executive deterioration in very 
elderly people, with some form of dementia or neurodegenerative 
disease. More than detecting and assessing executive functions, 
their primary role is to detect and assess executive dysfunctions. 
This being the case, it would be  helpful if the perspective of 
these tools was to be broadened and if they were to be reworked 
to assess the capacity of patients who are seen to have difficulty 
implementing their own decisions regarding their health or 
care plan. Poor executive autonomy (in any patient, not only 
the elderly or those with dementia) may be  the result of an 
impairment or disease (schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, 
attention deficit disorder, depression, addiction, etc.); however, 
it may also be  due to other emotional, educational, or cultural 
factors that are unrelated to the disease (or predate it). Indeed, 
weak executive autonomy is not always associated with an 
illness or impairment; it may also reveal a frequent condition 
which is very typical among humans. Many people—sick and 
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healthy alike—at times lack the inner strength they need to 
master themselves and overcome the most immediate desires 
or urges that deflect them from what they consider to be  a 
higher goal (in this specific case, properly adhering to the 
treatment). Since ancient times, all the most influential ethical 
constructions in western civilization have concerned themselves 
with this akrasia or weakness of will. In Book VII of his 
Nicomachean Ethics (one of the first philosophical treatises on 
the issue of continence and incontinence), Aristotle (2011) 
examined some very common cases in which the moral agent 
displays no consistency but rather an internal division. When 
the rational part wins out, the result is enkrateia (continence), 
but when the irrational part (desire) vanquishes, we  have a 
case of akrasia, that is to say, an agent who has a moral 
understanding of right but is led by an opposing desire not 
to submit to it. However, Aristotle does not link akrasia to 
any disease. Akrasia or incontinence (“I see the better and 
approve it, but I  follow the worse”, as Ovid puts it) extends 
beyond the clinical or medical field and is an essentially moral 
question. It is an example of human weakness of our tendency 
to passively follow an impulse rather than a deliberated option.
Just as everyone is characterized by being functionally 
different, there is also such a thing as “executive diversity”: 
each individual plans and implements decisions about their 
life and health in their own way, at their own pace, and there 
appears to be  no rule determining what is executively normal 
or healthy and what is not. Thus, just as there is no disease 
involved in many cases of functional diversity nor is any disease 
involved in many cases of executive diversity. Each individual 
is unique and unrepeatable; an individual’s degree of executive 
autonomy will be  the result of their pathology, their cognitive 
capacities, but also of their education and way of being in 
the world. Medics can treat patients with functional difficulties, 
cognitive barriers, or simply psychological features (untidiness, 
impulsivity, laziness, or excessive busyness, etc.) that hinder 
continuity between the decision they have taken at a given 
point in time in the doctor’s surgery and what needs to be done 
over a longer period.
Because adherence to topical treatment is a complex, 
multifactor issue with factors varying between patients, 
dermatologists should focus on determining each patient’s 
individual adherence barriers to achieve good treatment outcomes 
(Choi et  al., 2017). Factors influencing adherence include 
patient-specific characteristics, disease-related characteristics, 
treatment satisfaction, cosmetic acceptability, and the complexity 
of treatment protocols (Kuehl and Shear, 2018). At the same 
time, the role of the patient/physician relationship is a key 
issue in the management of lifelong, chronic conditions such 
as psoriasis. Patients want more information on psoriasis, fast 
treatments, clear expectations from the onset of therapy, and 
recognition of the emotional burden (Uhlenhake et  al., 2010). 
Therefore, the better doctors know their patients (psychological 
profile; personal circumstances and motivation for combating 
the disease; time they have or will have available for administering 
the therapy; expectations and experiences with other 
treatments), the greater their chances of getting the treatment 
plan right and ensuring better adhesion. In this regard, new 
topical therapeutic options need to offer a combination of 
higher efficacy and better patient acceptability, including easier 
application, to reduce treatment burden and enhance patient 
adherence. Recent studies report that cosmetic acceptability 
is a key contributor to adherence. Topical spray foam vehicles 
are innovative alternatives to creams and ointments. Well-
designed spray foam vehicles are easily spread over large areas 
of the skin, while importantly not leaving a greasy or oily 
film on the skin after application (Kuehl and Shear, 2018).
DISCUSSION: PATIENT AUTONOMY  
AND IDENTITY
Any consideration of autonomy must necessarily take into 
consideration the way in which agents interact with the 
environment in which they live. The autonomy of any living 
being must be accompanied by a certain context or environment 
which is conducive to the exercise of that autonomy. An 
individual’s degree of autonomy is related, on the one hand, 
to their capacity to perform different human activities, such 
as making a rational and conscious decision, managing their 
time or even pouring themselves a glass of water, and, on the 
other, to the range of possibilities offered them by the environment 
to develop or exploit these skills. Moreover, the development 
and exercise of the capacities enabling human autonomy are 
profoundly social. Only in a context of social interaction and 
mutual recognition, individuals can construct and develop 
their autonomy.
This social conception of human autonomy has been driven 
in recent decades by feminist philosophy and moral psychology. 
In the 1970s, feminist praised the ideal of autonomy and 
extolled its liberatory potential for women. In the 1980s, this 
view was challenged by other feminists who rejected the ideal 
of autonomy as it had traditionally been conceived. They 
regarded the notion of autonomy with suspicion because it 
was thought to presuppose a conception of the person as 
“atomistic,” as ideally self-sufficient, as operating in a vacuum 
unaffected by social relationships, or as an abstract reasoner 
stripped of distorting influences such as emotions. The 1990s 
witnessed a renewed feminist interest in autonomy but as 
relationally conceived (Friedman, 1997, p.  40; Stoljar, 2018). 
The term “relational autonomy” does not refer to a single 
unified conception of autonomy but is rather an umbrella term, 
designating a range of related perspectives. These perspectives 
are premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that “persons 
are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed 
within the context of social relationships and shaped by a 
complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, 
gender, and ethnicity” (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, p.  4).
Viewed in this way, autonomy reflects the capacity to perform 
tasks depending on the individual’s environment. In its most 
basic definition, capacity means the “ability to do” (being able 
to breathe, able to reason, able to walk); this requires from 
the agent both the material possibility of performing an activity 
or task and the skill or ability to carry it out. The first condition 
can be  measured in absolute terms: one either has or does 
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not have the possibility of doing something. It is, one might 
say, an internal or external imposition or limit, regardless of 
the agents’ volition or predisposition or the society in which 
they live. Human beings are incapable, by themselves, of flying 
or breathing under water. However, the second condition is 
more gradual and flexible and may be  manipulated by human 
interaction and technical and technological advances. People 
who do not speak English will be  incapable of understanding 
this text, although they have the possibility of doing so, either 
by learning the language or by using a translation tool (Arrieta, 
2016). The individual is a “spectrum of ability” (faisceau du 
pouvoir faire) (Ricoeur, 2008, p.  72) which is manifested in 
multiple domains of the human: power to say, power to act 
on the course of events and to influence the other players 
in the action, and power to bring one’s own life together in 
an intelligible and acceptable narrative. The notion of capacity 
constitutes the ultimate reference of moral respect and 
recognition of the human as a holder of rights, and it is 
closely associated with the notion of personal or collective 
identity (Ricoeur, 1997, pp.  28–29).
However, in extensive areas of healthcare ethics, there is a 
tendency to use a notion of autonomy that has been idealized, 
as if it corresponded to the needs of mature, healthy, and self-
sufficient citizens who make decisions independently, consciously, 
and rationally. Insofar as they restrict themselves to mental or 
psychological capacity, models of autonomy taken from the 
philosophical/legal tradition are deficient for constructing a 
patient’s autonomy, especially when applied in the context of 
chronic disease and long-term care. Here, we  need to establish 
a model of autonomy within illness (Casado and Etxeberria, 
2014), which is different from that conceived and enjoyed by 
healthy individuals. This reconceptualization requires, inter alia, 
an awareness of discoveries in neuroscience and the cognitive 
sciences and an emphasis on the relational nature of autonomy, 
two lines of work whose findings largely coincide. While physicians 
such as Cassell (2010) and Tauber (2005, 2011) observe that 
we  cannot apply a concept of autonomy to the healthcare 
relationship that is more characteristic of healthy individuals 
than sick ones, recent works in the field of neuroscience suggest 
that even the autonomy of healthy subjects does not match 
the standard model. Felsen and Reiner (2011) show that human 
brains are capable of the hierarchical control required for reflective 
thought, but that decisions conventionally perceived as 
autonomous may not be rational with respect to the deliberative 
process itself, and are rarely free from covert external influences. 
If the capacity for autonomy of healthy individuals needs to 
be redefined in order to align our moral values with neuroscientific 
naturalism, what about patient autonomy? It is even more 
complex and precarious than the autonomy assumed by the 
standard model (Moreno and Casado, 2011).
In our research group (“IAS Research  - Center for Life, 
Mind & Society”), we  view autonomy as the preservation of 
an identity over time through interaction with the environment. 
Rather than just a capacity for self-government, we see autonomy 
as the way in which certain complex systems manage to maintain 
a precarious identity through the generation of actions that 
ensure this continuance. What the agent does (conduct) is 
ultimately related to what the agent is (organization) and vice 
versa (Barandiaran and Moreno, 2006). From this perspective, 
the most important aspect is the mutual relationship which 
exists between maintaining the identity of an autonomous 
agent—in this context, a human—and that individual’s 
performance in the environment (Moreno and Casado, 2011, 
p.  54). Hence, in defining the identity of the autonomous 
agent, it is essential to take into account both the constitutive 
aspects (internal organization of the system) and the interactive 
aspects (relationship with the environment) (Etxeberria and 
Casado, 2008, p.  13). Indeed, human beings are constitutively 
interactive, and inversely, interaction makes us human and 
moral beings. Interaction with the environment is a constitutive 
element in the emergence of the social and cognitive capacities 
of living systems.
Although they do not explicitly distinguish between functional 
and executive autonomy, Casado and Etxeberria (2014) have 
argued that the different elements of patients’ autonomy can 
be  ordered on an axis that is related to the tension between 
their constitutive aspects (in the sense that they are properties 
of the patients vis-à-vis themselves) and their interactive aspects 
(the properties of the patients vis-à-vis others, such as medical 
practitioners and society at large). Decisional, executive, and 
functional autonomies are constitutive in nature because they 
mostly emerge from the patient’s personal qualities. However, 
the other two kinds of autonomy, narrative and informative, 
are interactive in nature; their exercise depends to a large 
extent on social and environmental factors and on the role 
played by people from the patient’s environment. Thus, patients’ 
power to decide for themselves when and under what conditions 
they choose to disclose situations related to their own lives 
and health (informative autonomy) will be subject to the cultural 
and legal modes of operating of the community in which they 
live. In a society that attaches little importance to the intimacy 
and privacy of its members, people will have little informative 
autonomy, however much they might desire it (Arrieta, 2016).
At the same time, any ethical judgment on a given situation 
depends not only on the decision-making of its participants 
but also on their mutual interaction (Colombetti and Torrance, 
2009). This leads us to think that the patient’s autonomy emerges 
as a consequence of the new identity they assume as a patient 
based on their interaction with practitioners, family, and society 
in general (Arrieta and Casado, 2014). This can be  seen very 
clearly in the case of the other interactive autonomy, narrative 
autonomy. Human disease can no longer be seen as an isolated 
and “objective” fact, far removed from the “story” of the 
individual who suffers it (Arrieta, 2012). Elsewhere, I  have 
argued (Arrieta, 2016) that the prevailing concept of autonomy 
both in medicine and in clinical ethics is more closely linked 
to the professional vision (disease), than to the social vision 
(sickness) or the personal vision (illness). An essential feature 
of modern western medicine is that it has prioritized the vision 
of the patient as an object rather than a subject. Seduced by 
a scientific ethos, modern medicine has tended to address the 
disease rather than the patient. To be  fair, evidence-based 
medicine has obtained good results, but many specialists believe 
it has also led to a decline in the quality of care and the 
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human quality that should characterize the art of curing. Instead, 
they advocate “patient-centered medicine,” which addresses in 
equal measure the emotional, psychological, and social aspects 
of the affliction of individuals requesting attention. In addition 
to the objectifying and third-person account that is characteristic 
of natural science, we  need to bring in the subjective first-
person account of the individual who experiences and feels 
the illness. When a disease is more or less chronic, no curative 
action of any quality can be provided without an understanding 
of what the disease is doing to patients’ self-esteem and the 
content or narrative focus of their lives.
We are, to a very large extent, the stories of our lives. The 
way in which the disease affects us depends on the way in 
which the sickness alters our stories (Brody, 2003, p.  269). 
Moreover, for many people, the pain, suffering, or incapacity 
resulting from different adverse situations (a serious disease or 
accident, bereavement, etc.) generate additional suffering because 
they burst in upon them dramatically and unexpectedly, because 
they entail a clear disruption of their present situation, and 
because they mark a “before and after” in their lives. In similar 
situations, we  find ourselves intellectually and practically 
disconcerted because, for some time at least, we  do not know 
where to place these events in our life story. Over recent decades, 
many philosophers have argued that identity and human life 
are constituted narratively (MacIntyre, 1981/2007; Schechtman, 
1996, 2012; Ricoeur, 1997, 2008; Gracia, 2004). The profound 
importance of narratives lies in the fact that they configure us 
in moral and identitary terms, for the fundamental reason that 
life has a narrative structure. People constitute their identity 
through the development of autobiographical narratives, explaining 
the circumstances that happen to them in their lives through 
accounts or stories that make sense of them. Unlike other living 
beings, narrative in humans is an organizing principle of our 
lives and the lens through which we  filter our experience and 
plan for actions (Schechtman, 1996, p. 113). Individuals constitute 
themselves as people by thinking of themselves as persistent 
subjects who have had experiences in the past and will continue 
to have experiences in the future. The unit of identity is a 
narrative, the “storyline” we  attribute to our lives: we  constitute 
ourselves as people through an understanding of our lives as 
narratives in the form of a person’s life story. This need to forge 
our own story, to “tell ourselves,” is especially visible in the field 
of healthcare and human disease; it is never an isolated event 
that can be  separated from the context of the life and story of 
the individual and community who suffer it (Gracia, 1991/2007).
Disease (and the pain and/or suffering that accompany it) is 
the effective cause that triggers the beginning of a care relationship. 
The disease disrupts the agent’s relationship with their own body; 
it alters individuality and therefore our understanding of and 
the relevance we  attach to autonomy. Pain and suffering are in 
themselves a source of reduced capacity for self-government. 
When we  get sick, we  cannot function normally as individuals 
because our capacity to be  a “self” is endangered. For affected 
individuals, entering a state of illness involves a series of 
transformations in their bodies, their subjectivity, and their physical, 
social, and cultural worlds (Carel, 2008). Human existence is 
embodied and defined by perceptual experience and thus, any 
alteration in the body and in people’s physical, perceptual, or 
behavioral possibilities entails a transformation in their identity 
and their capacity for self-government (Meyers, 2005).
The physical, psychological, and social effects of psoriasis 
can represent a major setback to the mood and quality of life 
of not only patients themselves but also their next of kin. In 
diseases of this type, it is not unusual to find a mismatch 
between how patients see themselves and how others see them. 
Trying to correct that distortion means emphasizing aspects 
of the patient’s narrative autonomy. For some of those affected 
(especially in mild cases of the disease, when it does not 
notably disrupt their everyday activity and way of life), it is 
little more than an annoyance, another symptom of their 
imperfect reality. Many others, however, are greatly affected 
by the cultural norms surrounding image. They suffer greatly 
from having a “visible” skin disease which has traditionally 
had a very bad press (in former times it was erroneously 
associated with leprosy) and which weakens, frustrates, 
embarrasses, alienates, and stigmatizes them, in many cases 
making psychological treatment necessary. It is estimated that 
at least 100 million individuals are affected worldwide, and 
this condition is becoming more common, since an apparent 
upward trend is observed in several countries (World Health 
Organization, 2016). Psoriasis is one of the most frequent 
reasons for dermatological consultation and one of the chronic 
diseases with the lowest rate of adherence to treatment. While 
there are many reasons for this phenomenon, assessing the 
executive capacity of each patient and acting accordingly might 
help increase adherence to treatment, resulting in an improvement 
in the living conditions of people with the condition.
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